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A bstract
We study participation decisions and bidding behaviour in Michigan Department of Transportation 
procurement auctions. Patterns in the bidding data suggest that bidders’ participation behaviour 
has a forward looking component. To fully understand the extent of these effects on auction 
outcomes, we construct and estimate a dynamic asymmetric auction model with endogenous par­
ticipation. We develop an estimation approach which builds on Guerre et al. (2000) and recently 
developed dynamic discrete game estimators. We then quantify the level of inefficiencies under 
the current auction rules and then consider how alternative auction rules affect efficiency. We also 
analyse the effect of ignoring dynamics in this market by estimating a static version of our model. 
This approach results in misleading conclusions concerning auction efficiency.
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Introduction
This dissertation contributes to an increasing effort to understand auctions and bidding behaviour 
in context, in particular, the question of how bidders decide whether to participate in an auction. 
In this environment, changes to auction rules will not only have consequences for bidding behaviour 
but will also have an effect on the participation decision of bidders and therefore on the success of 
the auction. For example, changing the competitiveness of an auction, can lead to bidders being 
discouraged from entering and thus leading to potentially worse auction revenues, as explained 
by Klemperer (2002). This interplay is even more important when considering auctions with 
asymmetric bidders.
This dissertation investigates these interactions in the context of procurement auctions run by 
the Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT). There are a number of interesting features 
in this market that warrant investigation. The first is the aforementioned fact that bidders in this 
market not only decide how much to bid but also whether to bid at all. The second interesting 
feature is that auctions run by DOTs occur frequently and with little time between auctions. On 
average, the timing between rounds of bidding is about two weeks. This raises the question of 
whether there is scope for dynamic linkages between auctions and, if these linkages do exist, how 
they affect the performance of auction rules. This also begs the question to what extent we can 
apply insights gained from the very well developed theoretical literature on the design of efScienct 
auction mechanisms1.
The first chapter of the thesis presents descriptive analyses of the bidding data. The aim of this 
chapter is to establish the potential existence of dynamic linkages between auctions. In particular, 
the existence of dynamics in participation behaviour is considered here. The chapter presents 
descriptive analysis of the market and then more detailed analyses of bidding and participation by 
regular bidders.
The second chapter uses the insights gained from the descriptive analyses to construct a theo­
retical model that can rationalize the observed bidding and participation patterns. We formulate 
the participation game as a dynamic game in Markovian strategies. The second part of this chapter 
shows how it is possible to estimate the primitives of this model.
The third chapter summarises results from an assessment of the performance of the auction
1See for example the contributions of Myerson (1981) and Riley &; Samuelson (1981)
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mechanism. Given the results, we then provide an alternative set of auction rules that will address 
some of the shortcomings of the existing mechanism.
The fourth chapter considers the consequences of only considering asymmetries due to bidder 
size and ignoring the dynamic asymmetries due to participation cost synergies.
Literature Review
Participation in Auctions: The theoretical auctions literature has focused much attention on 
analysing within auction bidding behaviour. However, there has also been an effort to under­
stand auctions in context with a particular interest in understanding participation behaviour of 
bidders. Samuelson (1985), McAfee & McMillan (1987) and Levin & Smith (1994) are the key 
references in this area. Samuelson (1985) considers an auction model where bidders must pay an 
entrance fee and perfectly know their values prior to entering an auction. Bidders will, therefore, 
only participate in an auction if their values cross a threshold value allowing them to make posi­
tive or zero profits after entry. McAfee &; McMillan (1987) and Levin &; Smith (1994) analyse an 
auction environment where bidders must pay an entry fee to learn their private values. McAfee & 
McMillan (1987) characterize optimal reserve prices in this environment. Levin & Smith (1994) 
provide a more detailed analysis allowing for mixed strategy entry equilibria and also considering 
the effect of market thickness, i.e. altering the number of potential entrants. Milgrom (2004) 
summarises this strand of research.
Structural Econometrics of Auctions: Given that auctions are a prevalent mechanism for the 
allocation of goods and services and that their rules are simple and known to investigators, auctions 
are an ideal environment for structural empirical work. The literature on the structural estimation 
of auctions begins with the parametric approach of Paarsch (1992). The approach here is to specify 
the parametric form of the value distribution and use the optimal bidding strategies and observables 
to derive a likelihood function. Standard MLE is not appropriate in these environments since the 
boundary of observed bids often depends on the parameter of the distribution of latent values. 
Donald & Paarsch (1993) propose methods to overcome this issue using piecewise MLE.
Laffont et al. (1995) suggest an alternative parametric method that takes advantage of revenue 
equivalence between first price and second price auctions. Instead of computing the distribution 
of winning bids in a first price sealed bid auction, which requires the computation of potentially 
hard to solve bidding strategies, and maximising the likelihood consistent with this density, Laffont 
et al. (1995) suggest simulating the distribution of winning bids from a second price auction using 
importance sampling for a given set of parameters of the value distribution and taking means. The 
parameters are then found by minimising the squared distance between the observed winning bids 
and the simulated ones.
An alternative non-parametric approach is due to Guerre et al. (2000). The important insight
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of this paper is that the first order condition for the optimality of a bidder’s best response can be 
re-written in terms of equilibrium bid distributions. This allows for the indirect estimation of the 
values for each observed bid. This paper also provides conditions for non-parametric identification 
of first price sealed bid auctions. The estimation approach proceeds in two steps. First strategies, 
i.e. the bid distributions are estimated. Second using the first order condition for an optimal 
bid pseudo-values for each observed bid are computed. These pseudo-values are then used to 
non-parametrically estimate the distribution of values.
Guerre et al. (2000)’s approach also cleverly bypasses the computation of equilibrium strategies. 
This is a major advantage especially when considering the estimation of asymmetric auctions and 
more complicated dynamic auctions where closed form solutions to bidding strategies might not 
be possible. For example, Jofre-Bonet & Pesendorfer (2003) provides an approach to estimating 
a dynamic auction model which we will discuss later. Li et al. (2002) propose non-parametric 
identification and estimation approaches for the first price auction with affiliation. Athey Sz Haile
(2007) provide further non-parametric identification results.
Krasnokutskaya (2003) provides a non-parametric method of estimating auction games with 
auction specific non-parametric unobserved heterogeneity that is common knowledge to all bidders. 
Krasnokutskaya (2003) uses tools from deconvolution theory and allows for asymmetric bidders. 
She also provides results on identification with unobserved heterogeneity.
Structural Econometrics of Auctions with Participation: There is also a growing literature on 
estimating static auctions with endogenous participation, for example, Athey et al. (2008), Li 
& Zheng (2009), Bajari & Hortacsu (2003) and Krasnokutskaya & Seim (2005). Athey et al.
(2008) consider the performance of alternative auction rules with endogenous participation. They 
estimate a structural model of open auctions with participation and simulate alternative auction 
environments. Using the structural estimates they also simulate auctions under the assumption 
of competitive bidding and collusion to explore whether the outcomes of a subset of auctions can 
be explained by collusive bidding. The key contribution of this paper is to take into account 
asymmetries between bidders. Asymmetries are an important determinant of auction outcomes 
and the interplay between participation and bidding with asymmetric bidders is difficult to anlayse 
theoretically. Athey et al. (2008) provide a direct analysis of this problem.
Li &; Zheng (2009) consider procurement auctions and estimate a number of different auction 
participation games. They then select a model that best describes the data. In particular, they 
consider which model can provide the best mean squared error of predictions for the ratio of actual 
to potential bidders and bids. Their particluar interest is then understanding two opposing effects 
in their theoretical models, namely the competition and entry effect on bids. The competition 
effect is simply the increase in competitiveness at the bidding stage as a result of a greater number 
of potential bidders. The entry effect is the negative effect an increase in the potential number
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of bidders has on the equilibrium entry probabilities. This leads to less actual competition in the 
auction stage and therefore to less aggressive bidding behaviour. The counterfactual analysis is 
then focused on understanding how these two effects interact in this auction environment.
Krasnokutskaya & Seim (2005) consider bidder preference programmes in California procure­
ment auctions. This paper studies what effect bidder preference programmes have, in particular 
whether preference programmes have adverse effects on procurement costs.
Bajari & Hortacsu (2003) are not explicitly interested in understanding participation behaviour 
in their paper. The main focus of this paper is to understand the magnitude of the winner’s curse 
in common value auctions on EBay for antique coins. However, the model they estimate takes into 
account that bidders have to make a participation decision and that the actual number of active 
bidders is unknown to the players.
Estimation of Dynamic Games: Hotz & Miller (1993) provides the foundations for all current esti­
mators of markov games. The typical approach in estimating maxkov decision problems has been 
to apply a nested approach developed by Rust (1987) or in the case of finite methods algorithms 
that solve the dynamic optimization problem by backward induction as in Keane & Wolpin (1997). 
The nested fixed point algorithm, for example, has an inner contraction fixed point algorithm to 
compute the value functions for each trial value of the parameters and an outer algorithm that 
searches for parameters that maximise a likelihood function. Hotz & Miller (1993) provide an ap­
proach that bypasses the computation of the solution to the dynamic optimization problem. They 
show that the conditional choice probabilities and the parametric assumptions on unobserved state 
variables can be used in an inversion to estimate the value functions. Manski (1993) also develops 
a related approach, the ’path-utility’ approach, which uses observations of other individuals to 
estimate expected payoffs. The approach of Hotz Sz Miller (1993) is also related to the two stage 
approach of Guerre et al (2000).
One of the first papers, we are aware of that makes use of these insights and estimates a 
dynamic game is Jofre-Bonet &; Pesendorfer (2003). This paper looks at how capacity constraints 
affect bidding behaviour. The approach taken here is a two-step approach that builds on Guerre 
et al. (2000) and Hotz & Miller (1993). Estimation proceeds again in two stages, where in the first 
stage bid distributions are estimated and then first order conditions are used to infer pseudo-values. 
The key difference here is that the first order condition involves a forward looking component which 
complicates estimation. Jofre-Bonet & Pesendorfer (2003) show how an expression for the value 
function can be found in terms of observables and how this can be used to estimate the model. 
The approach echoes Hotz & Miller (1993) in that observables are used to estimate conditional 
value functions.
There are a number of more general dynamic game estimators. Bajari et al. (2007) develop an 
estimator that allows for discrete and continuous choices. Their estimator is based on estimating a
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set of moment inequalities that an observed action has to fulfill and makes use of forward simulation 
to estimate value functions. Auguirregabiria & Mira (2007) develop a pseudo-maximum likelihood 
estimator. This estimator maximises a  likelihood constructed using best response functions derived 
from a Markov Perfect Equilibrium. Other papers that look at estimating dynamic games Eire Eind 
Pakes et al. (2007). Pesendorfer & Schmidt-Dengler (2008) develop an estimator that also proceeds 
in two stages, where strategies are non-paxametrically estimated in the first stage. In the second 
stage where the structural parameters are to be estimated, Pesendorfer & Schmidt-Dengler (2008) 
exploit the fact that the markov perfect equilibria can be characterised using a matrix equation 
which can be used for estimation. In particular, an equilibrium will be a fixed point of this matrix 
equation. The estimator then seeks parameters that minimise the distance between the equilibrium 
choice probabilities given beliefs implied by the model and the non-parametrically estimated choice 
probabilities.
The aforementioned papers estimate Markov games. However, there have been a number of 
papers that estimate non-markov dynamic games and take advsmtage of the particluar structure 
of games. In particular, Schmidt-Dengler (2006) and Einav (2010) estimate games of timing. 
Schmidt-Dengler (2006) considers a game of timing similar to Fudenberg & Tirole (1985) of tech­
nology adoption and estimates a model of MRI scanner adoption amongst hospitals. Einav (2010) 
estimates a game of movie release times. Both approaches take advantage of the ’’finiteness” of the 
game and use pseudo-backward induction algroithms to solve the games and estimate parameters.
Procurement Auctions: Procurement auctions are an excellent market environment for structural 
econometric work. The rules of the game are well understood and bidders sure experienced. These 
auctions have been analysed by, for example, Porter & Zona (1993), Bajari & Ye (2003) and 
Hong & Shum (2002). Porter Sz Zona (1993) and Bajari & Ye (2003) have a particular interest in 
developing tests for possible collusion in auctions.
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Chapter 1
Participation in M DO T  
Procurem ent A uctions
In this chapter I analyse MDOT procurement auctions. This chapter summarises interesting 
patterns that emerge from the participation behaviour of long lived regular bidders. We first 
present an overview of the market and present summary statistics on the data. We then move 
to a more detailed descriptive analysis of the bidding and participation behaviour of bidders to 
establish whether there are any dynamic patterns in participation. The data suggest there axe 
dynamic linkages between auction rounds. Specifically, previous round competition has an effect 
on current procurement costs. There is also evidence that dynamic synergies in participation 
exist. These synergies effectively create an asymmetry between bidders that will have a bearing 
on auction efficiency. To fully understand these features and their effect on auction outcomes, we 
construct and estimate a dynamic auction game. The level of inefficiencies due to auction rules is 
quantified and changes to the auction environment are considered. We then explore the effect of 
ignoring dynamics in estimation and find that this will result in misleading conclusions concerning 
efficiency.
1.1 The Procurem ent Process in M ichigan
In this section the data source and some aspects of the procurement process are described. Reduced 
form evidence of dynamic linkages between auction rounds is presented. In particular, we look at 
the effect of previous round competition on current round procurement costs. We then explore 
whether dynamic effects also exist when we look directly at an individual bidder’s participation 
and bid level decisions. The results suggest that past round competition lowers procurement costs 
by a small amount in current round auctions. There is also evidence that potential dynamic 
synergies exist in bidders’ participation behaviour and that past participation has an effect on 
bidding behaviour in current auctions.
The Awarding Process: The auctions under investigation award contracts for highway construc­
tion, bridge construction and highway resurfacing. Contracts are awarded by the Michigan State
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Department of Transportation (MDOT) in bi-monthly rounds using a first price sealed bid procure­
ment auction. A bid is a detailed cost break down for all costs, such as labour, mobilization and 
materials. However, the winner is determined solely by the level of the final total cost submitted 
by a bidder. Cost breakdowns axe mainly used to ensure that a bid adds up and is sensible. Bid 
breakdowns are also used to ensure that a bid is not "materially unbalanced”, to ensure that no 
bid skewing takes place1. MDOT requires that bidders pre-qualify before bidding2. An average of 
50 contracts are awarded in a round of bidding. The average project size is $1,476 million and the 
maximum project size in our data set is $165 million. The timing of contract rounds for the year is 
known in advance, however the contract characteristics are not fully known. Prior to the awarding 
of the contract, bidders can purchase plans for contracts, which detail the location of a project, 
the nature of the work and the estimated cost. The list of bidders who have purchased these plans,
i.e. the plan holders, is publicly known and posted on the internet. However, some plans can 
be downloaded free of charge from the MDOT website, where bidders’ identities are not revealed. 
Bids can be submitted in person or electronically. On the letting day, all bids axe unsealed and 
ranked. As mentioned previously, the lowest total cost bidder wins the auction, i.e. the bottom 
line cost of the project determines the winner. Bidders must also provide a bid deposit that is a 
pre-determined percentage of the contract value, as determined by the engineer’s estimate, prior to 
bidding. Once a contract has been awarded the primary contract winner is allowed to subcontract 
up to 60% of the contract value to subcontractors3.
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
N u m b e r  O f  
O b ser v a tio n s
M ea n S ta n d a rd
D e v ia t io n
M in im u m M a x im u m
Number of 
Bidders
Log o f Engineer’s 
Estim ate
Ranked2-Rankedl
Rankedl
R ankedl-Estim ate
Estim ate
4927
4927
4832
4927
4.943
14.205
0.083
-0.069
2.731
1.203
0.184
0.146
1
8.517
0
-0.198
19
18.922
0.880
0.626
Summary Statistics for all Bidders: We focus our attention on general construction contracts. 
Table 1.1 and Table 1.2 provide summary statistics of the data. Table 1.1 reports that on average 
an auction attracts 5 bidders, with some contracts having only one bidder and others with 19 
participating bidders. The third row of Table 1.1 presents data on ’’money left on the table”, 
which can give an indication of the level of uncertainty in the market. This is the percentage 
difference between the winning bid and the lowest losing bid. On average there is a difference of
1?, for exam ple, find that bid skweing is a frequent occurence in timber auctions.
2This entails a  check on the financial status of the firm. The information required for qualification includes: The  
identity of the owners, shareholder and managers of the company, any affiliations w ith other contractors, recently 
completed contracts and identity o f clients, previous sales, an average of the firm’s backlogs over the past three 
years, activities in other states, connections to other pre-qualified bidders, firm’s Balance sheet. M DOT also has 
a disadvantaged business programme to encourage participation from smaller or disadvantaged firms, however this 
occurs only on a small fraction of contracts.
3We do not have any data on subcontracting and exclude this from our analysis.
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about 7% with a standard deviation of 8%. This suggests that there are substantial informational 
asymmetries.
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics by Number of Bidders
Number of 
Bidders:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9-10 11-19
Obs. 91 742 999 781 618 534 376 272 286 228
Estimate
Mean 12.838 13.208 13.334 13.108 13.290 13.372 13.411 13.459 13.339 13.336
Standard
Deviation
1.030 1.093 1.176 1.297 1.286 1.262 1.221 1.087 1.157 1.053
Ranked 1-Est. 
“ ISF."'
Mean 0.008 -0.015 -0.045 -0.052 -0.062 -0.089 -0.084 -0.101 -0.112 -0.130
Standard
Deviation
0.128 0.133 0.152 0.161 0.163 0.1323 0.138 0.120 0.113 0.119
Ranked2-Ranked 1 
Ranked 1
Mean 0.113 0.082 0.082 0.063 0.059 0.053 0.048 0.043 0.041
Standard
Deviation
0.121 0.078 0.088 0.059 0.060 0.051 0.048 0.041 0.049
Table 1.2 summarises the data by number of bidders. The "Observations” row of the table 
reveals that 91 auctions attracted one bidder, 742 auctions attracted two bidders and so on. Table
1.2 also reproduces money left on the table data by number of bidders. It can be seen that money 
left on the table decreases with the number of bidders. However, the average amount of money left 
on the table is still substantial but is in line with other studies, see for example Krasnokutskaya 
(2003). Table 1.2 indicates that informational asymmetries matter in procurement competition. 
As the number of bidders increases the relative difference between the lowest bid and the engineer’s 
estimate falls. Also, notice that larger projects do not necessarily attract more bidders, the degree 
of competition in an auction is not related to the engineer’s estimate.
We now turn to the key question of whether procurement costs are affected by previous partic­
ipation decisions and whether entry dynamics matter. To establish whether this feature is present 
in the data, we run a regression on the log winning bid and a set of covariates, which include the 
log number of previous round bidders, the engineer’s estimate of the project cost and geographic 
variables. Table 1.3 summarises the results of an OLS regressions. The log number of previous 
round bidders and its squared component are individually statistically significant at 5% and are 
jointly significant at 5%. The regression results imply that increasing the number of previous round 
participants initially increases the winning bid level but after the number of previous round bidders 
exceeds roughly 3 bidders procurement costs start to decrease slightly, however the marginal effect 
of an additional bidder is very small. If we consider increasing the average number of bidders in 
a previous round by 10 bidders from 82 to 92 we see a 1% decrease in the procurement cost in a 
current auction.
We next turn to the individual bidder’s participation decisions. We first provide summary 
statistics on participation. To analyse an individual bidder’s participation decision we estimate 
probit models of the probability of entry by an individual bidder on a set of covariates including 
a measure of previous round competition.
1.2 Participation Decisions of Regular Bidders
The tables presented here focus on the behaviour of large and small regular bidders. A regular 
bidder has participated in more than 100 auctions and a large bidder is one with more than six 
plants in Michigan State. A similar definition of regular bidders is applied by Jofre-Bonet & 
Pesendorfer (2003) and Krasnokutskaya (2003). A plant is a base of operations for the contractor, 
where equipment is stored as well as materials prepared for construction. We use six plants as a 
cutoff since plant sizes for bidders are clustered around one and two plants or more than six plants4. 
We focus on regular bidders since these are firms considered by MDOT to be unconstrained and 
are able to concurrently complete a number of large projects. Participation rates are 7% of all
4This excludes the possibility that a bidder might have plants in neighbouring states and uses those to  mobilise 
equipment to  com plete a project. We will be investigating this in future.
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Table 1.3: Regression Results of Winning Bid on Covariates
V ariable
D ependent Variable: Log W inning Bid
Coefficient
(Std. Err.)
OLS
Log o f Engineer’s Estim ate 1.0058 **
(0.0020)
Log Number of Bidders in Previous Round 0.0338 *
(0.0122)
Log Number of Bidders in Previous Round Squared -0.0137 **
(0.0024)
Bay Region Dummy 0.0093
(0.0090)
Grand Region Dummy 0.0049
(0.0093)
M etro Region Dummy 0.0068
(0.0089)
North Region Dummy 0.0117
(0.0092)
Superior Region Dummy 0.0408 **
(0.0097)
University Region Dummy 0.0006
(0.0089)
Log Number of Auctions in Previous Round 0.0441 **
(0.0090)
constant -0.1913 **
(0.0303)
Number of Observations: 4880
auctions with the most frequent participating bidder entering 17% of the auctions of which they 
win on average 1.5%. Bidders on average are plan holders of around 11% of the contracts.
Fringe Bidders: However, before conducting a more detailed analysis of regular bidders, we 
present some statistics on fringe bidder participation. On average, there are about on average 
2.76, with standard deviation 2.37, fringe bidders in an auction. There is a potential pool of about 
500 unique fringe bidders. The average participation probability of a single fringe bidder is 0.51% 
with standard deviation 0.83%. Given that these bidders have such low participation probabilities, 
it is therefore reasonable to treat them as separate from regular bidders.
Participation in Auction Rounds: Given that contracts are awarded in rounds we also provide
some information on participation per round. Bidders participate in roughly 70% of the auction 
rounds. They enter in roughly 8% of auctions in a round, with an average of 50 contracts on 
offer per round which translates roughly to participation in four auctions in a round. Bidders 
participate in most of the auctions for which they hold plans but there is still uncertainty, being a 
plan holder does not guarantee participation. Figure 1.1 shows a plot of the number of plan holders 
for a project, i.e. bidders who have requested hard copies of plans and who then are listed on the 
webpage,versus the number of bidder who bid on the same contract. We might believe that there 
could be a backward bending relationship between the two, since bidders might be discouraged from
17
Figure 1.1: Plan Holder versus Number of Actual Bidders
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* * * * * * * * * * * *  * *  
* * * * * * * * * *
* * * * * *
Data Point 
45° line
10 15 20 25 30
Number of Ran Holders
35 40 45
bidding if they see a large number of plan holders. However, there is no such pattern. Moreover, 
we can see that sometimes the number of actual bidders exceeds the number of plan holders, i.e. 
there are data points above the 45° line. This occurs when plans can be downloaded anonymously 
from the MDOT website, introducing uncertainty into the actual number of bidders.
Only one large bidder is active across Michigan whereas only 1/3 of small bidders are active 
across the entire state of Michigan. It therefore seems plausible that geographic factors might 
affect participation and ignoring them could be misleading. The majority of small bidders bid 
on all types of contracts, and only one large bidder bids on all types. Again, this suggests that 
ignoring contract characteristics for the participation decisions will lead to potentially misleading 
estimates. However, some contract types do not occur very often, for example New Construction 
contracts represent 1% of the total number of contracts offered, Traffic operations are only 8% of 
total contracts and Roadside Facilities are only 5%.
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Table 1.4: Probit Estimates
V ariable Coefficient
Dependent Variable: Participation (Std. Err.)
(0 (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Participation in 0,1952** 0.1925** 0.1267 * 0.1152* 0.1811** 0.1575**
previous round (0.0185) (0.0185) (0.0203) (0.0205) (0.0192) (0.0240)
constant -1.5156** -1.5927** -2.6129** -2.7573** -2.4729** -3.6621**
(0.0095) (0.0011) (0.0797) ( 0.0800) (0.0279) (0.3617)
Large bidder dummy 0.2835**
(0.0141)
#  Auctions won 0.2835** 0.0158* 0.0119*
in previous round (0.0141) (0.0034) (0.0027)
Size of bidder 0.0444**
(0.0021)
0.0492**
(0.0021)
Afs -0.004 * -0.0034* -0.0036 * -0.0004 -0.0056* -0.0055
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0134)
Me -0.0185 * -0.0218* -0.0126 -0.0121 -0.0167* 0.1040**
(0.0078) (0.0077) (0.0081) (0.0082) (0.0079) (0.0280)
Bidder Fixed Effects NO NO YES YES NO YES
Auction Covariates NO NO YES YES YES YES
Time Fixed Effects NO NO NO NO NO YES
Number of Auctions: 4927 
Number of Bidders: 30
1.3 E xistence o f Dynam ic Synergies in Participation
We now present reduced form evidence on the probability of participating in an auction. The 
descriptive analysis here seeks to determine the existence and qualitative features of dynamic 
synergies in participation. We estimate a set of Probits to determine whether participation in 
at least one auction in the previous period has an effect on participation in an auction in the 
current period. This would give an indication of whether there is evidence for synergies between 
rounds of auctions. We also considered specification where participation effects from rounds in 
even earlier time periods, for example participation in auctions two rounds before the current and 
so on. In those specification, there were no statistically significant dynamic participation effects. 
We therefore restrict attention here to descriptive analyses that only focus on immediately previous 
rounds of bidding.
The average participation rate in auctions is about 7.2%. We can see from Table 1.4 column 
one that participation in an auction in the previous round increases the probability of participating 
in a current auction round from 7.2% to 9.5%. We also control for regular opponent’s previous 
round entry behaviour. In particular, Ms, Me is the number of small and large regular bidders who 
participated in the previous round of bidding. M s,M e  are jointly significant in this specification. 
The effect persists when we include bidder fixed effects as in column (iii). However, the bidder 
fixed effects reduce the magnitude of the participation effect. The dynamic effects also persist 
when other contract characteristics are included such as the type of project and the location of the 
contract. We also consider in columns (ii) and (v) specifications including a bidder size variable. 
In all specifications the dynamic participation effects persist in their statistical significance.
In columns (iv) and (v), we partially control for potential capacity constraints by including the 
number of contracts won in a previous round of bidding. In these specifications we still find that 
the own participation status has a positive effect on participation probabilities.
There might still be concerns that these descriptive analyses are picking up other effects, such 
as firms taking on non-MDOT contracts. A feature of this market is that construction in the 
winter months in Michigan stops. During this period firms are essentially not affected by capacity 
constraints or other construction related activities. However, MDOT still awards contracts during 
this period. It should then be possible able to recover the pure effect on own participation status 
on participation probabilities during winter months. To take into account seasonality, round fixed 
effects are included in the probit specifications. The results are shown in column (vi). With this 
specification, the own activity status effect still persists and remains statistically significant.
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Table 1.5: Bid Level Estimates (Heckman)
V ariable
Dependent Variable: Log of Bid Level
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.)
Log(Engineer Estimate) 0.9751**
(0.0016)
Participation in 0.0166
Previous Round (0.0106)
constant 0.3862**
(0.0780)
Large Bidder Dummy -0.0323 *
(0.0104)
State Variables
Ms -0.0009
(0.0006)
Me -0.0038
(0.0033)
Number of Auctions: 4927 
Number of Bidders: 30
1.4 Bid Level Decision:
Table 1.5 summarises results from Heckman estimates of the bid level decision. The engineer’s 
estimate is clearly the strongest influence on the bid level. State variables do not have a statis­
tically significant effect on bid levels. In particular, own participation status has no statistically 
significant effect on bid levels. The large bidder dummy has a negative sign, which indicates po­
tential asymmetries between large and small bidders. We also consider a specification with bidder 
fixed effects for each regular type bidder. In this specification the own participation variable is 
significant and leads to a 7% increase in the bid level. This is evidence that there might be dynamic 
effects on bidding behaviour from previous round participation.
To summarise, the reduced form evidence suggests that dynamic linkages between auctions do 
exist and can have an impact on procurement costs for MDOT. Previous round competition has 
a statistically significant effect on current auction procurement costs. There is a positive effect 
of previous round participation on current auction participation, which indicates the existence of 
some form of synergies. Previous round competition and participation have little effect on the 
bid level decision. These results merely indicate patterns in the data and are by no means causal 
relationships. This prevents us from making stronger statements about the causal nature of these 
outcomes.
To understand these effects more fully, we therefore proceed to construct a structural economet­
ric model that will allow us to understand the dynamic strategic effects that might be operating in 
this market and quantify their effect. The data suggest that participation is a costly process and 
that participating in consecutive rounds of bidding is less costly than in non-consecutive rounds.
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The preparation process must therefore generate two types of knowledge, one which is project spe­
cific, i.e. knowledge about completing a specific project in a specific location, and another which 
is general and transferable but time-sensitive. The latter would be knowledge on the activities of 
the firm and the activities of other firms. The next section outlines the theoretical framework we 
take to the data that seeks to capture this notion.
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IChapter 2
A  D ynam ic Structural M odel o f  
Participation in A uctions
In this chapter we construct a theoretical model of auction participation in a dynamic framework. A 
dynamic auction game in which participation is decided in every period is constructed here. Entry 
into an auction is costly and bidders must pay an information acquisition cost to learn their private 
completion costs,which are equated to the opportunity cost of preparing a bid. Bidders compare 
the expected profit stream from participation and non-participation to determine entry. There 
are information acquisition synergies between auction rounds. Specifically, a bidder can improve 
the information cost draws in the next period by participating in an auction in the current round. 
Once a bidder decides to enter an auction the bidders engage in a first price sealed bid procurement 
auction.
2.1 Participation and Auction Game
2.1.1 Setup and Assumptions
This section outlines the theoretical bidding model. The focus of the analysis is on risk neutral1 
long-lived bidders who participate in more than 100 auctions in our data set. Bidders who partici­
pate in fewer auctions are categorised as short lived fringe bidders. Throughout it is assumed that 
participation is solely determined by information acquisition costs. These costs can be interpreted 
as bid preparation costs, i.e. the opportunity cost of having to discuss the completion of a project. 
It is also assumed that once private costs are known, a bidder will participate in the auction2.
Time is discrete with an infinite horizon. There are two types of regular bidders, large bidders 
N £ =  {1,..., Ac}> who have more than six plants in the state, small bidders N 5 =  {Ac +  1 ,..., Ac +  
N s}, who have up to six plants, and a fixed set of fringe bidders Nyr =  {N c  +  A s -I- 1,..., A f  +  
N s  +  Ac}. We will sometimes denote the total number of bidders as iV =  Nc  +  A s +  A T- A
1T he assumption of risk-neutrality can be justified by realising that m ost regular bidders are large corporations 
and are active in various states. We can therefore use a portfolio diversification argument.
2A n  alternative participation model is by Samuelson where bidders already know their valuations when they  
make their entry decision but have to  pay a cost to  learn their values. Here the set o f bidders will be  a  selected  
sam ple of bidders who have valuations above a certain threshold value. It is possible that the true participation  
decision is a hybrid between the Samuelson (1985) and Levin & Smith (1994) participation game. Li &: Zheng (2009) 
estim ate these different auction m odels in their paper.
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typical bidder of either type will be denoted by i. The number of bidders of each type does not 
vary over time.
The Stage Game: Each time period t is broken down into two stages, the Participation Stage 
followed by the Auction Stage. The sequence of events is as follows:
1. Participation Stage
(a) Each bidder i receives a draw from a private information acquisition cost distribution 
at the beginning of period t
(b) All bidders decide simultaneously whether to enter the auction
2. Auction Stage
(a) Contract characteristics co,t axe revealed to all bidders
(b) Without observing the outcome of the first stage, each bidder learns their own comple­
tion cost privately
(c) All participating bidders simultaneously submit bids without knowing the actual number 
of bidders participating
(d) The contract is awarded to the low bidder
This setup is similar to Li & Zheng (2009)’s specifications of the entry game. Krasnokutskaya 
(2003) assumes that bidders know the identity of their opponents. We assume that bidders ignore 
plan holder information, since our data is from a period where it was also possible to download 
plan anonymously. The published plan holder list will therefore not always be complete and there 
is still uncertainty about the actual level of competition for a contract. However, if we did choose 
to include the plan holder information, the only difference from our model would be the inclusion of 
an extra stage prior to the participation stage, which determines plan holder status. This has been 
excluded for simplicity and, as described previously, the fact that plan holder status is not recorded 
for all bidders. We have also undertaken some reduced form analyses on plan holders and found 
that the dynamic synergies discussed in the previous section persist when controlling for plan holder 
status3. In addition, the inclusion of plan holder information would require the state space of the 
dynamic game to be expanded which will make the estimation more computationally burdensome. 
We have also assumed that bidders decide on entry prior to contract characteristics being revealed. 
However, in future we will correct these issues by allowing for plan holder information as well as 
some contract characteristics, such as project locations, to be used.
3To establish this, we turn our attention to  participation behaviour of bidders, given that they are plan holders. 
In particular we look at the probability of participation given state variables as before for the subset o f bidders who 
have expressed an interest in the contract. The results suggests that the effects of that state variables persist with  
a reduced magnitude. Specifically, the probability of participating is increased by 10% if a  bidder participated in 
the previous round of bidding. In other words, it does seem that even when controlling for plan holder status the  
between round synergies we posited still exist.
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As mentioned before, the procurement auctions under investigation are run in rounds, where 
up to 100 construction contracts are auctioned off at once. This might introduce scope for possible 
synergies between contracts offered in the same round or possible exposure problems, where bidders 
win too many contracts a t once. These possibilities me not considered in this model, due to the 
lack of further information on ex post costs and the department of transportation not offering 
contracts in packages. Moreover, only intertemporal substitution of auctions and not within round 
substitutions are considered. The rest of the setup is as follows:
Reserve Price: The Michigan Department of Transportation requires that the winning bid be lower 
than 110% of the engineer’s estimate. If the Department wishes to accept a bid higher than this 
threshold, it is required to write a justification for doing so. The data have a number of projects 
being awarded for more than the threshold. This suggests that these restrictions do not come into 
effect very often. We follow Krasnokutskaya (2003) and assume there is no binding reserve price. 
We also follow Li Sz Zheng (2009) to address the issue that there is a chance a bidder will face no 
competitors and could then bid an infinite amount. To avoid this Li & Zheng (2009) suggest that 
when a bidder is the only entrant he must compete with the Department. We, therefore, assume 
that when a bidder is the sole participant, he will then face the DOT that draws a completion cost 
from a regular large bidder’s cost distribution.
Contract Characteristics a t time t are denoted by co,t € Co and are drawn from the known 
exogenous distribution Fo(.). Future contract characteristics are unknown to all bidders. The 
contract characteristics are the physical attributes of the contract. Our analysis restricts attention 
to the engineer’s estimate of the project size.
Private Completion Costs: Bidder i of type j  = C, «S, T  draws private costs, c*jt G C ?, indepen­
dently and identically from the cost distribution Fj(ciit|co,t) on [c,c], conditional on co,t- The 
assumption of independent private values can be justified by assuming that differences in cost 
estimates are due to firm specific factors such as differences in opportunity costs and input prices.
An action for bidder i in period t is given by the participation decision and the bid submitted at 
the auction stage, a^t G A* =  {0,1}U [0, oo). Sometimes, the participation decision will be denoted 
separately by G {0,1} and the bid by b^t G [0, oo).
Public States for Regular Bidder i: Bidder i is characterised by a publicly observable state vari­
able Sitt G S i = {0,1} that affect its actions. The state is the participation status of a bid­
der in the previous round of bidding, i.e. s^t =  di^-i-  The vector of all bidders’ state vari­
ables is given by st =  (s i,t ,..., sjv,t) G S =  We will sometimes use the notation
S - ij  — (si.t, S2 ,t, •••, ^  S_i =  to denote the vector of state variables
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excluding bidder i. The cardinality of the state space S equals m s — 2 N.
Private States for Regular Bidder i of type j: Information Costs, (f>i>t € =  [1, oo), are drawn
independently and identically from the conditional distribution with associated density
hj{<f>i,t\si,t)-> and are unobserved by other bidders and the econometrician. Information costs have 
a Markov structure and have following transition probability:
(2-i)
where log[aj(siit)] =  o o j+ a ijS i.t-  Both parameters axe unknown to the econometrician but known 
to the bidders. Rivals’ actions and states do not affect the private costs of information acquisition. 
We have experimented with alternative specifications of the information cost distributions and 
estimated the model with them, including the exponential and half-logistic, however neither of 
these distributions comes close to matching the estimated choice probabilities. We, therefore, 
settled for the Pareto which provided a better fit. Note, that the structure of the information 
cost distribution is such that participating in an auction in this period will allow bidders to draw 
information costs from a more advantageous distribution, i.e. a distribution with lower mean, in 
the next period. It is possible to make the information cost depend on more than one previous 
period and to allow for cumulative cost advantages. However, this has been excluded in the current 
analysis but will be explored at a later date.
Information Costs for Fringe Bidders: Fringe bidder i needs to pay information cost K  to learn 
her private completion costs.
Discounting: Bidders discount the future with common discount factor /? G (0,1), known to the 
econometrician and the bidders and fixed over time. The annual discount factor equals f3 = 0.9. 
Note that this imposes forward-looking behaviour of regular bidders. Hendricks &; Porter (2007) 
discuss possible strategies for identifying the discount factor using exogenous variation in the 
bidding environment.
Conditioned Independence: As in Rust (1987), it is assumed that the unobserved information costs 
are conditionally independent of observable states. Also note that the structure of the problem 
already embodies the usual assumption that the private ’’shocks”, here the information costs, are 
additively separable. For further discussion of these assumptions see Rust (1994).
Bidder Strategies: Strategies for bidder i of type j  are restricted to be Markovian for the entry 
game. The strategy for bidder i of type j  = C ,S,J- consists of a participation strategy df 7 (s, <^) 
and a bidding strategy b°j(s, c*, cq) and will be denoted — (dfj(s, </>*), &£ •(s, c», C o )). Formally, 
a Markov strategy is a map, Oij : S x <&j x Cj x Co —► At . Fringe bidder strategies are denoted 
separately by o^jr and the set of all fringe strategies is denoted ajr = { e r^  : i = 1,..., Njr}.
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Strategies consist of a bidding strategy and an entry strategy d°F.
Beliefs on the Probability of Participation: To form the necessary expectations and to compute the 
probability of a bidder winning an auction bidders’ beliefs of the likely number of bidders based 
on the decision rules of bidders must be defined. Beliefs are
/OO H d ijis t ,  4>) =  l}hj(<j)\si,t)d<j> (2.2)
The above is the expected behaviour of firm i of type j  when i follows its participation strategy in 
cr. The integration is over private information costs 4>.
Characterisation of Payoffs for Regular Bidders: A bidder decides whether to enter an auction 
and incur the information cost by comparing the value of participation and non-participation. 
Let iy/0(st ; o’, ojP) be the value of not participating at state st with all opponents following their 
strategies prescribed in a  and WP^s^cr, ojP) be the value of participation. We will define these 
values more carefully after introducing some more notation. The Bellman equation for bidder i of 
type j  is then:
W/ (st, <j>i,t ',(T,(Tjr) = max j  W j (st; a, ojr) -  4>i<t, W 3i0  (st ; <r, oT ) } (2.3)
Next define the ex ante value function as the integrated version of the above Bellman equation, 
where all private information is integrated out:
/OO W i(s t ,<l>-,a,ar)aj (si,M -° ‘^ - 1dcl>, Vs, (2.4)
We can then write the choice specific values as:
=  E c>c max[6 -  c] P r(i wins|si)t, s_ i)t, b, c0; a, ojr)
+P 5Z  P l(s't+ i\st,di)t = l;(T,ojr)Vf{s't+i-,(7 ,ojr) (2.5)
s ' t + i€ S
and the value of not participating
W 30 {st,o ,o jr)= Q  + f5 ^ 2  Pr(s'i+i\st,d i>t= 0;o ,o jr)V P (s,t+1 -,cr,(jjr) (2.6)
s ' t+ i€ S
The value function can equivalently be written as
V?(st ;(T,or) = q i j (st )(W ?1 (st ; cr,o^) -  E^ cf)\(f> < ( 3 {st ; <7 , 0 ?)]) +  [1 -  qi,j(st)}WP0 (st ',o,(Tjr) (2.7)
where (st ; (7, ojr) = W 3X (st ;cr, ojP) — W 30 (st ; cr, o?) and we have made use of an individual bidder’s
decision rule, as defined in (2.2). This formulation will be useful for estimation later on. The
probability of a bidder winning an auction is given by,
/  i  wins against \  f t  wins against \  /  i wins against \
Pr(z wins) =  Pr I N c  potential C J X Pr I N s  potential S  I X Pr I Nyr potential J7 I (2.8)
\  type bidders /  V type bidders J  V type bidders /
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where if bidder i is of type j  and k = 0,1 indexes the participation status of a bidder 
/  i  wins against N j  \
Pr I potential j  type  J =  (2-9)
\  bidders /
N°'i "
N, t -  11'J
fc=0,l
" 0 , 3  =  0  
" 1 , 3  =  1 { 3 = £ }
where CTj(.|c0it,Sfc) is the equilibrium bid distribution at state sk,t =  (k, s_i)t) where k — 0 ,1  
is the bidder’s own participation status, so t and Siit are then states for a bidder who did not 
participate in a previous round and a bidder that did participate, respectively. C n^’J =
(N k , j  l{si,t=fc} \ are j^je usua] binomial coefficients, and N t , is the total number of biddersn k, j  J  ’3who have participation status k =  0,1 and 1 {j=c} is an indicator. The indicator captures the
aforementioned assumption that a bidder will always face at least one large bidder, either an
actual large bidder or the Department. 1{S< is an indicator that equals one if the bidder has
participation status k. If a bidder i is not of type j  then the above is simply:
/  * wins against N j  \
Pr I potential j  type I =
\  bidders /
N o , j , N lt j
E  II  [C"‘.i] ~  -  Gi(M«o.«.<>*.*)]n‘J (2.10)
„0„ = o  *=0'1
Note, that the main difference between (2.9) and (2.10), is that in (2.9) we are correcting for the 
number of opponent players that are of the same type as player i. For fringe bidders the equivalent 
expression is:
( i wins against Njr \  N?
potential T  type j =  P r ( n ^ |S t ) [ l  — Gyr(&i t |co ,t, S*)]n:F ( 2 - H )
bidders J  n r= Q
We discuss in detail how we specify the term Pr(njr|st ) in the next section.
Markov Perfect Equilibria: A MPE in this game is a set of strategy functions a* such that for any 
i of type j  and for any (s, ^ ,C j,co) G S x x C j  x Co,
< > , & )  =  arg max { U W fa o * ,p '? )  -  &) +  (1 -  di)(W/0(s;<T*,py)) (2.12)
and
bfj(s,Ci,co) Gargmax[6i -C j]P r(t wins|s,6i ,co;a,* ,a t)  (2.13)f>i€B
where B =  [0, oo).
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Existence of Equilibrium in the Participation Game: Following Auguirregabiria & Mira (2007) 
and Pesendorfer & Schmidt-Dengler (2008), the existence of equilibria of the participation game 
is analysed in probability space. A bidder will enter an auction if
W?i(s*; <X,cjjt) -  (f>i<t >  W* (s,;<x, (2.14)
(2.14) characterises the optimal decision rule. The above can be evaluated before the information 
acquisition costs are observed which yields the ex ante optimal choice probabilities, induced by a*, 
given perceptions of opponents’ entry strategies, a and a jr.
/ OO 1{w? i(si5 <*t ) ~  W/o(st; > 4>}dHj{(j)\sitt) =  Ai,j(st ;<r, ( 2 . 1 5 )
pitj is therefore the optimal choice probability induced by the MPE a * defined previously. Equi­
librium existence of the participation game is easily shown by looking at the ex ante optimal 
choice probabilities defined previously. Let the set of ex ante choice probabilities be given by 
A(q) =  {A ij(s t -,(y) : i =  1,..., N  & j  =  £ , «S}, these are the choice probabilities induced by the 
strategies in <r, where q  =  {q ij(s') : i =  1,..., N  & j  = C, S  & s' E S} is the set of entry decision 
rules for all regular bidders, as defined in 2.2. Equilibrium points are therefore fixed points, i.e. 
let p be the set of optimal choice probabilities for every state and every bidder then
P =  A(p), (2.16)
since beliefs in equilibrium are consistent. These choice probabilities are well defined and contin­
uous in the compact set of bidder’s choice probabilities. Brouwer guarantees that at least one set 
of beliefs exist for this system.
Existence of Equilibrium in the Auction Game: The auction game resembles existing static auctions 
considered in the theoretical literature. First note that the following hold: the completion cost 
space C j  is a separable metric space with measurable partial order, the joint density of types is 
bounded and atomless, action space is compact, and payoffs are continuous for every c G [c,c]. In 
our case the interim payoffs are log supermodular and therefore single crossing holds. Following 
Reny (2008), the auction game we consider has an equilibrium in monotone pure strategies.
2.2 Estim ation
Our data consists of repeated observations of bids, participation decisions for all players and 
contract characteristics for T  periods.
data =  {6i)t, di>t, c0)t : i =  1,..., N; t = 1 ,2,..., T }  (2.17)
In this section we show how private costs can be inferred from observed bids. We then show 
how the participation model can be estimated using an asymptotic least squares estimator. The
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first step requires the estimation of auxiliary parameters of the model, i.e. the optimal choice 
probabilities of participation Pi,j{st) and the equilibrium bid distributions. We then use the first 
order condition for an optimal bid to compute an expression for privately known costs as a function 
of the submitted bid, the equilibrium bid distribution and the optimal choice probabilities. We 
then outline an optimal minimum distance estimator that finds parameters which minimise the 
distance between the non-parametrically estimated choice probabilities and the choice probabilities 
implied by our model.
2.2.1 Optimal Choice Probabilities
Per period profits do not depend on the identity of the bidder but merely on the number of each 
type of bidder, i.e. the number of laxge and small bidders, all relevant information in •
i =  1,2, ...,iV} can be captured in a bidder’s own participation status dijt- 1 and the number of 
competitors of each type, defined as =  Z)fceN£\i ^M -i & N s,t = 52k’%ns \i dk ',t-1- Following 
Auguirregabiria & Mira (2007), the optimal conditional choice probabilities at some state sm =
(s, A//;,.A/s) are estimated by simple frequency estimators, for states not observed the nearest
neighbour is used. The estimator has the following form:
~  iTr \r  \ S t  l { ^ i , t  =  =  s ,  Mc,t =  A/]c, A /s ,t  =  A fe }
Pj{s,J\£,Afs) =  ------------ 1 t ’-------------------------------------~------------:—~— (2.18)
EieNj E t=o,i E f  =  k,St =  Si, Nc,t =  Me, Ms,t =  JV5 }
Ideally, we would make use of kernels to smooth over states that we do not observe and are 
exploring possible approaches to this. We use these probabilities as inputs into the computation of 
the transition matrices and the period payoffs. The estimation routine does not require us to use 
nearest neighbours. We could equally only use choice probabilities for observed states and then 
estimate the structural parameters. However, this would be inconsistent with the auction game, 
since bidders take expectations over all possible number of bidders and not just over observed 
bidder configurations. At a later stage we will explore alternative methods that will not require 
the use of unobserved states.
Fringe Bidders.:Fringe bidders enter with same probability p* conditional on state variables, as 
specified by their entry strategy in Oj?. With a large number of potential bidders, we model 
the number of fringe bidders in an auction as a poisson process with parameter S depending on s, 
similar to Bajaxi h  Hortacsu (2003). In other words, the probability of observing njr fringe bidders 
is given by:
p -s& 8 (S\n*r
Pr(nH s) =   ------ - y —  (2.19)njrl
where log[<5(s)] =  60  + £iA/s +  62A//;.
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2.2.2 Bid Distributions
Following Athey et al. (2008) and Jofre-Bonet & Pesendorfer (2003), bid distributions are estimated 
parametrically and assumed to follow Weibull distributions. We assume that the shape parameter, 
x/j ij  and scale parameter, depend on the contract size and the state variables. The bid 
distributions have the following functional form,
/  iog(frt,t+i) v
\  V,2j'(co,l , 5 i,t , S—j^ ) J (2.20)
where V’fc.jO) is given by ]ni/}kjj(co, sM,s_ M) =  ^ k}0j + ^k,ijCo,t +  ^k,2jSi,t + $k,3jN c,t + 
for j  =  C, S  Sz k =  1, 2.
Fringe Bidders: We assume that the fringe bid distribution is also described by a Weibull distrib­
ution.
Gjr(btrt\cott,s t) =  1 -  exp (2.21)
where logi>k,T(co,t, &t) =  ^k,T ,o +  V ^ .ico .t +  +  f p k ^ ^ c  for k — 1, 2, where the last two
terms in the expression axe the number of laxge and small bidders who participated in an auction 
in the previous round.
2.2.3 Private Costs
The first order condition for an optimal bid can be re-written to yield an expression for private 
information Cijt, in terms of observables:
ci,t — bi,t — [r}c(bi,t, st> co,t;<7*) -1- Tjs(bi,t,st , cq,*;cr*) +  Tir(bitt, st ,co,t;aj?)\ - l (2.22)
where
q /  i wins against N j
\  potential j  type bidders b i , t i Sf, CQ^ti (J  ^ / d b i j
P r (  i wins against N j bi,t> St , C0)t;
(2.23)
potential j  type bidders
The second term in (2.22) is the markup term. The exact form of (2.23) can be found in the ap­
pendix. The above closely follows Guerre et al. (2000), except that expectations axe taken over the 
number of actual competitors with the number of potential competitors constant over time. Quasi­
valuations can be computed by estimating the equilibrium bid distributions Gj( . \ co)t, Sijt, s_ i>f) and 
substituting these into expression (2.22). This allows for point-wise estimation of the private cost 
distribution.
2.2.4 Parameters of the Participation Game
The primitives are estimated by finding parameters that minimise the distance between the non 
parametrically estimated choice probabilities and the choice probabilities implied by the model. 
Values can be computed from the data conditional on the structural parameters, these can then
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be used to compute optimal choice probabilities for our model. Let 6  =  (qo,£, c*i,£, cto,<S) c*i,<s)- 
Given the Pareto distribution assumption on information costs this allows for a simple form of the 
value function. We can use equation (2.7) together with the Pareto assumption to re-write the 
value function for bidder of type j  as:
V '(s<ft,s_ <tt;<r*, *>,*) =  (2.24)
1 -  atj^Sij)
where ^ ( s t ,a*) =  The details of the derivation of the value function can be found
in the appendix. The next step involves substituting the expression for an optimal bid into the 
expected period payoff function. Specifically, changing the variable of integration from cost, c to 
bids b yields
’b Pr(i wins|s*it, 6, cq; cr*, cr£)
^  (s*,t j S—i,t5 <7 , (Jjr) — E c
r  * i K t ,  , o; , <
I . . 9j\P\Si,tiS—i tj co)dbJo r}c + r}s + T ]jr
(2.25)
where 77^ , 775 and T)jr are as defined in (2.23). The above can be used in the ex-ante value function 
which is then given by
P J(sM,s_ i>t;<r*,(7> ,0) =  y ( 8 t><T*y(3Mj8_M;<7 * ,a »  (2.26)
+P 7J (st ,a*) ^ 2  PT(st+i\st,di,t =  i;a* ) +  [ i - 7 J (st , £T*)]Pr(s;+1|st ,diit =0;cr*)
8't+ieS
X V i  ( S ; + 1 ; „ } r ,  9 )  +
Now let n 3 (<7 ' , ( j f )  — [7rJ(s'; o*,o^)]B'gs bo the vector of expected period payoffs , V*{o* , 0 ^ , 8 ) =  
/es be the vector of values, P J (st) =  \pj(dijt = 1 [s'; cr*)]s/es is the vector of choice 
probabilities, P^cr*) =  diag([7J (s', cr*)]s/eSi) and M{(a*) is the m s x m 3 transition matrix induced 
by participation in the current round of auctions. In other words, row s G S of the transition matrix 
is given by [Pr(s'|s, d = 1; cr*)s/eg]. And let A-7 =  diag([aj(s')]s/eSi) be a m s x m s diagonal matrix. 
The matrix equation for the value function can then be written as follows:
V V .ffJ r i* )  = P ( O I F (o ',a ? )  + /?[P((X *)(M f(0 - Mg(<7‘ )) +  M (5 (< r* )]l"W jd « ) (2.27)
+ ( /  -  A i ) - l A> ■ l
where i is a m s x 1 vector of ones. The above can be re-arranged to yield
V V ,* > ;0 )  =  [I -  0 P '( O ( A ^ ( O  -  M lia*)) -  p M ii* * ) ] - 1 (2.28)
x [r i{(7 *)nj (a*,(T*r) +  (J -  Ai )~1Ai ■ i]
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To compute the value function estimates of the choice probabilities, defined above, and the period 
payoffs are required. The period payoffs can be computed by numerically integrating the expression 
in (2.25). To compute the expectation with respect to bitt in (2.25) Gaussian quadrature methods 
are applied as outlined in Judd (1998) and with respect to contract characteristics the payoffs are 
evaluated at a fixed random sample of 50 contract characteristics and simple averages are taken. 
Given the above we can then compute the optimal choice probabilities implied by our model. 
The probability that a bidder enters an auction, given her participation in the previous round of 
bidding, is given by
(2.29)
ttj (st ;<r*,CT» +  /? ^  [Pr(sj+1|st , ditt =  1;(T*) -  Pr(s't+1|st , diti = 0; a*)]VJ(s't+1;a*, a?) si,t
*t+1
Stacking the above expression over states and bidder types yields p  =  A(p; 9). The estimator 
forces the equality constraints p  — A(p; 9) =  0 to estimate the structural parameters. In other 
words the estimator given first stage estimates is given by
nun (p -  A(p; 0))' W (9) (p -  A(p; 9)) (2.30)
0
where W  is the optimal weight matrix which depends on the covariance matrix of auxiliary para­
meters and the bid distributions and the derivatives of the estimating equations with respect to 
the auxiliary parameters and the parameters of the bid distribution functions4. Specifically, the 
optimal W  is given by
W ( 6 )  =  ( [ (1 : 0 ) -  V (p,* ).A (p;0)] £  [(1 : 0 ) -  V (p ,* ) 'A (p ;» ) ] ')_1 (2.31)
0 is a (2 * m s) x matrix of zeros, where is the number of parameters in the bid distribution 
function, \Er is the vector of bid distribution parameters, and E is the variance covariance matrix 
of the choice probability estimator and of the bid distribution parameters. The optimality of this 
weight matrix follows from the conditions presented in Gourieroux & Monfort (1995). Asymptotic
normality of this estimator is also established there. Our estimator is different from Pesendorfer
Sz Schmidt-Dengler (2008) since payoffs are known and computed in the first stage of estimation. 
As a result, our weight matrix will not only depend on the variance covariance matrix of the 
optimal choice probabilities but also on the bid distribution estimates. Given that our first stage 
estimates are consistent and asymptotically normal we can directly apply the results in Gourieroux 
& Monfort (1995).
4 Note that the special feature of auction participation games as opposed to  standard market entry gam es, is that 
the payoffs do not contain any unknown parameters. As a result, for certain information cost specifications we can 
directly compute the information cost parameters, for example this is the case w ith the exponential distribution.
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2.2.5 Identification
Identification of the latent values of bidders follows directly from the conditions from Guerre 
et al. (2000). In particular as pointed out by Athey &; Haile (2007), the identification result from 
Guerre et al. (2000) can be re-interpreted as being conditional on the realisation of auction specific 
covariates and state variables. For identification we require monotonicity of the markup term in 
(2.22) conditional on auction covariates and state variables.
The parameters of the dynamic game are overidentified. This can be established following 
Pesendorfer & Schmidt-Dengler (2008). In particular, we can also write an equilibrium characteri­
zation linear in the unknown parameters for a bidder that is just indifferent between entering and 
not. This equation system will have more equations than unknowns. In our case period payoffs 
are known, except for the bid distribution and the optimal choice probabilities. The only unknown 
parameters of the dynamic game are therefore those of the information cost distribution. The best 
estimator for our problem is the asymptotic least squares estimator outlined above making use of 
the optimal weight matrix.
2.3 R esults
This section presents results of the estimation. We begin by summarising the estimation of the 
auxiliary parameters followed by estimation results on period payoffs and the structural parameters. 
In each section we provide evidence on the goodness of fit of each estimator.
2.3.1 Optimal Choice Probabilities
We estimate choice probabilities by frequency estimators, as shown in (4.6), and use these two 
compute the transition matrices. Goodness of Fit: To test the goodness of fit we compare the 
average number of large and small bidders across all auctions in our data with simulated numbers 
computed using our choice probability estimates. For each realisation of the state variables observed 
in the data, we select the associated choice probability and draw a uniform random variable on 
[0,1], if the choice probability is greater than the uniform variable the bidder enters. We complete 
this procedure for large and small bidders separately. We compute the mean simulated number of 
large and small participants across all auctions and compare with the data. We find that the mean 
actual number of bidders is 0.457 and the simulated mean is 0.448, with standard deviations given 
by 0.656 and 0.637, respectively. The means are not statistically different at 99% confidence. The 
average number of small bidders is 1.723 with standard deviation 1.754. The simulated number is 
1.7290 with standard deviation 1.251. The means are not statistically different at 99% confidence.
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2.3.2 Bid Distribution Estimates
The parameters of the bid distributions axe shown in Table 2.1. Goodness of F it: To test the 
goodness of fit of the bid distributions, we follow Jofre-Bonet & Pesendorfer (2003) and Athey 
et al. (2008) and compute the mean and standard deviation of the observed bids across all auctions 
and compare with means and standard deviations of bids generated by the estimated distribution. 
The computation of the means proceeds as follows. First we extract the bids, the number of bids 
submitted in each auction and the associated auction covariates including the state variables from 
the data. We compute the mean and standard deviation of all bids observed in our data. We then 
use the data on the number of bids submitted in an auction and the covariates to draw bids from 
our estimated distribution. We then compute the mean and standard deviation across all drawn 
bids. This computation is done separately for large and small bidders.
For large bidders the mean of observed log bids is 13.503 and the simulated mean is 13.5116, 
with standard deviations given by 1.1298 and 1.1232. The difference between the two means 
is statistically not significant at 99% confidence. Similar results are found for the small bidder 
distributions, with an observed mean of 13.512 and a simulated mean of 13.596, with standard 
deviations 1.1232 and 1.2287, respectively. The two means are not statistically different at 99% 
confidence. We conduct similar tests for the fringe bidder distributions and find similar results.
We also simulate a low bid from the distributions. This test is more appropriate since the 
minimum bid determines the procurement costs of MDOT. We take the minimum bid in each 
auction by large and small bidders across all auctions, the number of large and small bids submitted 
and the associated auction covariates. We compute the mean and standard deviation across the 
entire set of minimum bids for each type of bidder separately. We then draw the same number 
of bids as observed in the data from our estimated distribution for each set of auction. We then 
compute the minimum bid in each auction and compute the mean and standard deviation across 
all auctions.
For this test, we follow Athey et a l (2008) and we consider the means and distribution of the bid 
residuals. Specifically, given the Weibull distribution we can write a bid from bidder i of type j  as 
K t = sitt, s_i)t)e*)t(co,i, sitt, S - i%t)  which can be re-arranged as ^ / ^ ( c o . t ,  si>t,s_ itt) =
Ci,t{co,t> si,t, s_ i.t). We then compute the bid residuals for the observed minimum bids and for our 
simulated minimum bids. We find that for large bidders the means of the residuals are given by 
0.994 and 0.988, for the actual and simulated bids, respectively. The standard deviation for the 
observed bids is 0.013 and for the simulated it is 0.020. The means are not statistically different 
at 95% confidence. For small bidders the observed mean is 0.985 with standard deviation 0.019 
and the simulated mean is 0.939 with standard deviation 0.068. The means are statistically not 
different at 95% confidence. We therefore find that the fit is good for both distributions.
Effect of Individual Variables on Large Bid Distribution: We compute the mean of our estimated
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Table 2.1: Bid Distribution Estimates Whole Sample
V ariable
Large
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Small Fringe
0 io, constant 1.8385 1.8351 1.4342
(0.1062) (0.0408) (0.0020)
0 n , engineer 0.1897 0.1898 0.2122
(0.0092) (0.0033) (0.0002)
020, constant 1.6591 1.6593 1.6488
(0.0104) (0.0221) (0.0001)
02i , engineer 0.0702 0.0702 0.0710
(0.0007) (0.0014) (0.0000)
State Variables
0 12, i’s state, sitt = 0.0299 0.0263
(0.0698) (0.0263)
013» #  of large bidders in previous round, Me 0.0071 0.0069 0.0003
(0.0029) (0.001) (0.0001)
014» #  of small bidders in previous round, Ms -0.0602 -0.0573 -0.0363
(0.0316) (0.0071) (0.0004)
022, i’s state, sitt — ditt- \ 0.0018 0.0018
(0.0023) (0.003)
023, #  of large bidders in previous round, Me -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001)
024, #  of small bidders in previous round, Ms 0.0010 0.0010 -0.0008
(0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0000)
Number of Auctions= 4927 
Number of Bidders= 30
Weibull distribution for the average engineer’s estimate and value of the state variables.
Log of Engineer’s Estimate: Increasing the engineer’s estimate by 0.01 increases the mean from by 
1%, the variance decreases from 0.0453 to 0.0452.
State Variables: Increasing M e by one increases the mean of the distribution by 0.8% and the 
variance increases to 0.0535. Increasing M s by one increases the mean by 6.8% and the variance 
increases to 0.2623. Very similar results are found for the small bidders distribution.
2.3.3 Estimation of Private Costs and Markups
Recall that markups over costs are defined in (2.22). We substitute the estimated density and 
bid distribution into this expression evaluated at the observed bid and its associated covariates. 
On average the observed markup for large bidders is equal to 21.46%. The average markup for a 
winning bid is equal to 25.89%. The average markup for a small bidders is 21.08%. The average 
markup for a winning small bid is 23.76%. The average markup for a fringe bidder is equal to 
24.27%.
Krasnokutskaya (2003) estimates her model using MDOT data as well, however for a different 
time period, and finds markups in the order of 8% and for a winning bid the markup is 16%. 
The main difference between these results and ours is the inclusion of unobserved heterogeneity 
which reduces the amount of variation due to private information. It is possible, as in Athey
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Figure 2.1: Bid Function for Large Bidders
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et al. (2008), to include parametric unobserved heterogeneity into the bid distributions here and 
estimate a Weibull-Gamma mixture. We aim to implement this feature in the future. Jofre-Bonet 
& Pesendorfer (2003) find markups that exclude dynamic effects on average roughly equal to 20%. 
Bajari et al. (2006) and Bajari et al. (2004) estimate markups that are equal to 6%.
In Figure 2.2 we plot the cost distributions for the sample average of the engineer’s estimate 
and at the most frequently observed state variables, which occurs in 13% of the auctions. We can 
see that the large bidder distribution has a lower mean, which we would expect given that a large 
bidder is more able to mobilise equipment across the state of Michigan. Note, that this was not 
imposed during the estimation. The average cost for a large bidder is $521,130.04 and for a small 
bidder the mean is $836,069.91. Moreover, the difference in costs is statistically significant at 99% 
confidence.
Bidding Function: Given our estimates we can compute the bidding function. We use (2.22) to 
compute an optimal bid for different completion costs. The bid function is plotted by holding the 
state variables fixed, taking an average of the engineer’s estimate and varying the completion cost. 
The results can be seen in Figure 2.1. The bid function approaches the 45° fine. We also find that 
for bids at the lower end of the bid support, we compute negative costs which we find implausible. 
When we find negative costs we set these equal to zero, as in Jofre-Bonet & Pesendorfer (2003).
We can also compare how bidding behaviour changes as a bidder’s own participation status 
changes, i.e. when si<t =  0 and when si t = 1 and all other state variables remain unchanged. The 
results are shown in Figure 2.3. It can be seen that a bidder who has s^t =  1 bids higher, i.e. places 
a higher markup on its costs. The reason for this asymmetry is that the bidding strategy takes
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Figure 2.2: Completion Cost Distributions For Most Frequently Realised State
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Figure 2.4: Bid Function for Large Bidders
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into account that bidders are asymmetric in their entry behaviour, due to size and information cost 
differences. A bidder who was active in a previous round therefore faces one fewer rival who on 
average is going to have a lower information cost. A bidder with t =  0 has to take expectations 
over a larger number of bidders who were active in a previous round and who will enter with 
a higher probability and will therefore have to bid more aggressively. Put another way, when a 
bidder’s own state changes from si<t =  1 to t =  0 the potential pool of bidders of type whose 
participation status was 1 increases by one. Therefore, the number of potential high probability 
entrants is higher for a bidder with =  0 then one with si>t =  1, and therefore the bidder must 
bid more aggressively since the potential number of actual competitors is higher. Recall that from 
the reduced form analysis we found a positive effect of own participation on the bid level. However, 
we would expect this effect to be reduced when we are in state configurations when there a large 
number bidders who were active in the previous round. This is precisely what can be seen in Figure 
?? where we have plotted a large bidder bidding function for a state where the maximum number 
of previous round large and small bidder participants is reached and only own participation status 
of the bidder changes.
2.3.4 Period Payoffs
We compute ex ante expected period payoffs using (2.25) yielding payoffs as a function of public 
states. These results will be used as inputs in the estimation of the structural parameters. The 
average period payoff over all possible states for a large bidder is $111,901.14 and for a small bidder 
it is $43,539.92.
39
2.3.5 Information Costs
The parameters for the participation game are presented in Table 2.2. Given the parameters 
we can compute the average expected sunk information cost, i.e. E^ icj)\(f> <
Wq (st ; cr*, cr r^)) averaged over all states. The information cost amounts to $9212.10 for a large 
bidder and $3979.90 for a small bidder. For states where a bidder participated in the previous round 
the average information cost is then $8052.30 and for states where a bidder did not participate 
is given by $10,371.97. For small bidders the average information cost for states where they 
participated in the previous round is given by $4043.30 and for states they did not the average 
information cost is $3916.50. Average information cost sunk by smaller bidders are lower than large 
bidders, since small bidders require very low draws for the information costs in order to enter. As 
shown in the previous section, small bidders’ period payoffs are on average much lower than large 
bidders, therefore a small bidder requires a much lower information cost to induce participation, 
since the expected profits from participation are not as high as a large bidder.
Table 2.2: Structural Parameter Estimates
V ariable Coefficient 
(Ltd. Err.)
otc, o -4.8346
(0.0101)
ct£t i 0.2245
(0.0064)
as,o -5.2267
(0.003)
ats, i 0.1322
(0.0001)
Goodness of Fit: To test the goodness of fit of our model we simulate the number of entrants
for all observed states and compute the average number of bidders across all auctions. We draw 
information costs from our estimated distribution for 0 and compare this to the value of entering 
given by the difference W /(st ; cr*, <r^ r) — Wq (st ; cr*, The average number of large bidders is 
0.4572 with standard deviation 0.6555. The model predicts an average number of 0.3920 with 
standard deviation 0.5930. The model underpredicts the number of entrants on average. On 
average there are 1.7233 small bidders with standard deviation 1.7537. The model predicts an 
average number of entrants equal to 1.4210 with standard deviation 1.1528.
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Chapter 3
Policy Im plications and 
Sim ulations
In this chapter we consider the performance of the auction mechanism using the estimated primi­
tives. With the primitives in hand, it is possible to assess potential allocative inefficiencies and to 
simulate the effects of addressing these inefficiencies. The first step is to determine whether the 
presence of asymmetries between bidders leads to misallocations due to the use of a first price auc­
tion. The second section deals with addressing potential issues with the mechanism by considering 
an alternative auction rule that leads to efficient allocations, which, however, might have adverse 
effects on procurement costs.
3.1 Inefficiencies due to A uction Format
When bidders are asymmetric it is possible that a first price sealed bid auction will lead to inefficient 
outcomes. In our model there sure two potential sources of asymmetry. The first is through the size 
of the bidder which affects the completion costs and the other is through the dynamic synergies in 
participation. To determine whether this is the case in the MDOT data we use the primitives to 
estimate how often the low bidder does not win the auction, holding the entry process fixed.
We take a random sample of 250 contract characteristics and compute the simulations for the 
same set of contracts 1000 times. The steps of the simulation are as follows. We draw information 
costs from our estimated information cost distribution and use the estimated strategies of large 
and small bidders to determine entry. For fringe bidders we use the estimated poisson model to 
determine the number of entrants. After the entrants have been determined we draw bids and 
use the inverse bidding strategy to compute costs. We then compute the fraction of auctions 
the low bid does not correspond to the lowest cost. We find that this occurs on average in 
10.84% of the auctions. The average difference between the low bidder and the winner’s cost 
is 4.31% of the engineer’s estimate. Krasnokutskaya (2003) estimates the average probability of 
inefficient outcomes in her MDOT data at 5%. Jofre-Bonet & Pesendorfer (2003) find a 32% 
average probability of the low bidder not winning.
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3.2 Changing the A uction Format: Open Auctions
Given that there are inefficiencies due to auction format we consider changing the auction rule. 
The open auction rule can lead to efficient outcomes, when bidders play the dominant strategy 
equilibrium in which they bid their costs truthfully. We exclude fringe bidders in this analysis, 
since we have not explicitly estimated the primitives that drives fringe participation behaviour. As 
mentioned before, we focus on the dominant strategy equilibrium where all bidders bid their costs. 
We then look at the change in procurement costs relative to the original format and the presence 
of fringe bidders. We simulate this auction using the same random sample of 250 contracts used 
in the efficiency measurement exercise.
As mentioned before, conditional on entry, the auction stage game can be easily simulated 
given that the strategies we focus on take the simple of form of bidding one’s costs. We draw 
costs for the entrants and compute the auction price and profits. If there is only one bidder in an 
auction, they must compete against the MDOT who draw their costs from a regular large bidder 
completion cost distribution. The next step is to compute an equilibrium for the entry game. The 
main challenge we face here is that there are potentially multiple entry equilibria, as described in 
Doraszelski & Satterthwaite (2009). We initially search for equilibria using the estimated entry 
choice probabilities as starting values.
The first step in this exercise is to compute the expected period payoffs for the auction stage 
game at all states for a player of type j .
N jT  n S  -  1{j=S} N C -  1{j=£}
7rj I (s) = '52 X  X  PT(nr ,n s ,n c ) E COjCtX[ (x -c ) l(c < x ) \s ]  (3.1)
njr n s  n c
where x  =  min{cfc}££;*ns+n£, is the lowest cost of the participating opponent bidders. To evaluate 
the above integral, we apply Monte Carlo techniques. Given the payoffs we can then search for the 
optimal set of choice probabilities that are fixed points of the aforementioned equilibrium condition
P =  A(p) (3.2)
There are potentially multiple fixed points for the above, however for this counterfactual exercise 
we follow Ryan (2006) and will focus on only one. Procurement Costs: We now compare the 
procurement costs in the simulated open auction with the realised procurement costs. Using the 
same intuition as in Athey et al. (2008), we would expect the open auction to discourage entry 
from small bidders, since their chances of winning are reduced as large bidders no longer shade 
their costs more than small bidders. As a result, this could then also lead to an increase in the 
procurement costs. In our case the procurement cost in the open auction are on average 133.33% 
of the engineer’s estimate with standard deviation 24% and the observed procurement costs are 
95.51% with standard deviation 14%. The mean procurement costs are statistically different. We 
also compare the procurement costs if we made information costs zero, excluded fringe bidders and
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used an open auction format. In this environment all bidders enter since participation is costless 
and the dynamic effects have been removed in this market. In this case the average procurement 
costs are 11.94% of the engineer’s estimate.
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C hapter 4
A Static Participation M odel
In this chapter we present and estimate a static version of our dynamic game in order to determine 
the effect of ignoring dynamic linkages in these auctions. The estimation approach we take here 
is similar to the dynamic game estimator presented previously. However, the simple structure 
of these auction games, specifically the fact that period payoffs are known and do not contain 
unknown parameters aside from the bid distributions and entry probabilities, allows for an even 
more straightforward estimation approach.
The static model echoes our dynamic participation game. Bidder’s participation decision is 
again completely determined by the information cost which is unobserved by the other players. 
Bidders compare the information acquisition cost with the expected profit from entering the auc­
tion, if this difference is positive they enter, if not they stay out.
4.1 Setup
Bidders are risk-neutral and are categorised as large (£), small (<S) and fringe (T) bidders, as in 
the main paper. Denote the set of bidders of type j  as N j. The game is structured as before.
Private Completion Costs: Bidder i of type j  = £ ,S ,J -  draws private costs, c* € Cj, independently 
and identically from the cost distribution Fj(ci\co) on [c,c], conditional on co,t*
Information Costs for type j  bidder: All types of bidders draw information costs from a Pareto 
distribution with density
=  (4 -1 )
Let Hj denote the distribution of <f) for type j .
Strategies consist of a bidding strategy and an entry strategy. A bidding strategy maps from the 
completion cost to a bid. The entry strategy specifies a cut-off value for entry costs. Denote the 
participation choice separately as dj for bidder of type j . Denote the set of strategies for each type 
separately a  =  {cr*,j, i = 1, N  h j  =  £ , T , 5}. Let qj be the ex ante expected entry probability
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for a bidder of type j , in other words
1*00 ___/ OO 1 {<*»(« =  1 } M ^ ) #  (4-2)
The above is the entry probability of a bidder if they follow their strategies specified in aj. 
Payoffs: A bidder’s expected profit conditional on entry is given by:
7rJ (c q , Cj, cr) =  max[6 — c*] Pr(i wins|5, Co; a) (4.3)b
where
/  i  wins against \  /  i  wins against \  /  * wins against \
Pr(t wins) =  Pr I N c  potential C J X Pr I N s  potential S  I X Pr I Nj r  potential T  J (4.4)
V typ>e bidders J  \  type bidders J  V type bidders J
and where
(i  wins against N j  \potential j  type j =  (4.5)bidders J
Nj~ l{ieN •}
n j = 1 U = c y  j
where l{»GNj} is 2111 indicator that equals one if bidder i is of type j
Equilibrium: A type symmetric equilibrium is a collection of bidding strategies for each type of 
bidder and entry strategies with property that, bidder’s bid strategy maximises profits conditional 
on entering and each bidder only enters if the expected profits, prior to revelation of contract 
characteristics, exceeds information acquisition cost. Denote the equilibrium strategies as a*. 
Denote the equilibrium entry probability for a bidder of type j  as pj.
4.2 Estim ation
4.2.1 Entry Probability
We estimate the entry probability for each regular bidder type separately and non-parametrically 
by a simple frequency estimator.
ZiGNj H i = 1}
Pi — ---------— ^---------------  (4.6)
Z k= o , i Z l  H d j , t  =  k }
Entry probabilities for large players is given by 11.43% and for small players 6.63%. We test the 
goodness of fit of these estimates by assessing whether the estimator can reproduce the average 
number of entrants of each type. We find that they indeed can.
For fringe bidders we estimate entry probabilities by assuming that the number of fringe bidders 
follows a poisson process with distribution given by:
P r(n^) =  e- ± r  (4.7)
n j r \
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4.2.2 Private Costs
We assume that all bidder types have the same functional form for their bid distributions. All 
types have bid distributions that follow a Weibull distribution, with shape and scale parameters 
functions of the contract size.
(4.8)
for j  =  .F, £,«S where log V>fcj(co,t) =  ipk,j,o +  V’fcj.iCo.t for k = 1,2. The fit of the bids is tested 
following the same procedure outlined in the main paper. We find that the bid distributions fit 
well. We then use the first order condition for an optimal bid to infer private costs as described 
previously. In other words private costs can be estimated by computing:
c*,t =  &i,t -  {nc(bi>t, c0,t ; cr*) +  r)s{bitt, c0>f; a * )  +  r]r(bijt; <r*)]- l
where and
n p r /  i  wins against N j
y potential j  type bidders bitti CQ,ti &  ^ / dbij
Pr (  * w*ns against N j  
\  potential j  type bidders bi,t j Cott'f
(4.9)
(4.10)V c o , t ’i & ) —
The above expression will have a similar structure to the dynamic version.
4.2.3 Entry Cost Distribution
Given the first stage estimates we can directly compute the parameters of the entry cost distrib­
ution. The first step involves computing the expected profits from an auction, prior to contract 
characteristics being revealed. This involves substituting the expression for an optimal bid into 
the payoff function in (4.3). We then integrate over private costs and contract characteristics. A 
change of variable of integration from c to b yields
nj (a*) = E,Co /
JO
Pr(i wins|6, c0;cr*)_ . .■gj{b\co)db (4.11)
r)c +  Vs +  rjjr
We use Gaussian quadrature to evaluate the integral with respect to bids and take a random sample 
of 50 contract characteristics and take simple averages. A bidder will enter an auction if
5fJ (cr* ) >  4>, (4.12)
This optimality condition can be evaluated before the information costs are known, by integrating 
over information cost acquisitions, which yields the ex ante optimal entry probabilities
/
°° ~ ~ ~ 
l{7r^(<7*) >  (/>}hj{(f>)d(f) = i/(7r*(cr*)) =  1 — (cr*)\~aj (4.13)
We can now simply rearrange the above expression to infer the value for otj for each type of bidder, 
which yields
_  Iog(l ~ P j)
log(7rJ(<r*))
Everything on the right hand side is known and we can therefore infer the value of oTj.
(4.14)
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4.3 R esults and Comparison to  Dynam ic M odel
We summarise the main results of the estimation below.
• Markups are comparable to the dynamic model, average markups across all auctions for large 
bidders is 25.08% and for small bidders is 24.13%.
• Completion costs are on average higher for small bidders than for large bidders. We com­
pute costs for a bidder at the average engineer’s estimate. We find that average costs for 
a large bidder are $475,376.40 and $570,297.98 for a small bidder, with standard deviations 
$134,688.55 and $568,837.87 for large and small players respectively. The means axe statis­
tically different at 95% confidence.
• Entry costs sunk by bidders are on average $3553.28 for large bidders, and $4283 for small 
bidders.
• Inefficiencies: Holding the entry process fixed, we simulate auctions for the same random 
sample of 250 auction covariates used previously, and repeat the experiment 1000 times. We 
test the efficiency of the auctions using the same procedure outlined in the main paper. It 
turns out that only 0.1% of the auctions are inefficient with an average cost difference of 
0.29% of the engineer’s estimate.
To summarise, the estimated entry costs axe on average lower than the dynamic model. Average 
markups are roughly in line with the dynamic estimates. However, the major discrepancy between 
the two approaches are in the measurement of inefficiencies due to the first price auction rule. 
The static estimates imply virtually zero inefficiencies. One possible reason for the low level of 
inefficiencies is due to the fact that the asymmetry between bidders who participated in a previous 
round of bidding has been removed from the static framework. Recall the discussion of the bidding 
function in the previous section. In Figure 2.3 we saw that bidders of the same type bid differently 
for participation statuses si>t =  1 and s%tt = 0. The static model, on the other hand, does not 
allow for this asymmetry between bidders of the same type. Ignoring this asymmetry between 
bidders who are of the same type but have different states would make the first price auction 
seem less inefficient than it actually may be. Unfortunately, we cannot compare these results with 
other papers that consider static auctions with participation such as Athey et al. (2008) or Li & 
Zheng (2009) since they either do not measure inefficiencies due to auction rules or only consider 
symmetric auction models.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This dissertation analyses procurement auctions of the Michigan State Department of Transporta­
tion. We find evidence of dynamic linkages between auction rounds. In particular, past partic­
ipation has an influence on current procurement costs. We also find evidence for participation 
synergies between rounds of bidding. To fully account for these features we propose an estimation 
procedure for auctions with endogenous participation in a dynamic framework. Private completion 
costs and parameters affecting information acquisition costs and participation are estimated. We 
then quantify the level of inefficiencies due to the use of a first price auction rule. The probability 
of an inefficient outcome is roughly 11%. We find that changing the auction rule from a first 
price auction rule to an open auction, increases the average procurement costs, however it does 
eliminate the inefficiencies caused by asymmetries of bidders in first price auctions. We find that 
the driving force behind higher procurement costs, is that smaller bidders are discouraged from 
entering. There is also scope to analyse the efficiency of entry in this setup. We could, for example, 
consider limiting potential competition. These policy simulations will be pursued at a later date.
We then compare our results to a static participation model. The estimation output leads 
to misleading conclusions concerning the inefficiency of the auctions. In particular, we find that 
the probability of an inefficient auction is close to zero. This divergence can be attributed to 
the removal of a source of asymmetry between bidders in the static model, namely synergies in 
participation between rounds. This result emphasizes the importance of considering potential 
dynamic effects in auction markets.
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Appendix A
A ppendix
A .l  Derivation o f the Value Function
This result follows if one computes the conditional expectation defined in (2.7) using the Pareto 
assumption. Specifically, in equilibrium
p>(st)E44>\<l> < (Hat)) = /
f iirj/B  \  _  w J / e -------------\ l - a , f s , . t ) + l
Notice that 1 — pj(st ) = (W i(st \a,(Tjr) — Wo(st;<r, 0>-))-Qy(s<-*), then we can write the above as:
< (Hat)) = , (l-pj(s,))[W^(B,;<T.ffJr) -  W’^ s . ja ,^ ) ]  -  . ,(A-2)
Using this in (2.7) with the equilibrium choice probabilities leads to (2.24).
A .2 Com putation of Markups
To compute the expressions in (2.23) we require the derivative of the probability of a bidder. Let 
9 j(- |co,t, Sitt, s_ i,t)  be the associated density of the equilibrium bid distribution. When bidder i is 
of type j  this derivative equals
/  i wins against N j  \  
d P r I potential j  I 
V type bidders )
dbi,t
N0,3 ~
N i , j  -
”-o,j =  0 fc=0,1
ni.J = 1ii=c}
X [ C n - » j ]  Pjfa-kT-^i l  - Pi(s_t ))w-*J - n-*J [l -  G j(6 ji(|c o ,„ s_ jti()]n-fc,j (A-3) 
for regular bidders and if i is not of type j  then the above is equal to:
/  i wins against N j  \  
d P r [ potential j  j
V type bidders J
dbi>t
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No,j,Ni'j
Y  Y [C» ‘i ]  -  Pj(s*))w,'J - " ‘-i [l -  Gj(6<>t|cfc,e, St>t)]**>■-- 1 rjfcjPj(bi.ticfc,t , s fc,t)
n 0,j =  0 fc=0)1
niJ = 1 {J=c}
X [c^:/]pj(s-„)"-‘'>(l-Pi(s-i ))JV-‘J- n-‘-i [l-Gi(6i,.|c-M.s-M)]n-*J (A-4)
and for fringe bidders
( i  wins against Nj? \
potential T  I ^
typ e  bidders )  ^  _ Mnr  g A K A ^ U ^ t )  / A ^
----------------- db~t------------ L =  E  i - g ^ m K „ s , ) (A~5)
* 7 l J T = 0
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A. 3 Identification
We follow Pesendorfer &; Schmidt-Dengler (2008) and focus on the indifference expression for a 
player to  establish identification. In this section we drop j  type superscripts to ease exposition. A 
player is indifferent between entering and not entering if the difference between the value between 
entering and not entering is equal to the cost of information acquisition:
s_M; a*, o*T , 9) -  W0(sj>t, s_M; a*, <r>, 9) = <f> (A-6)
where <f> is an indifferent type. We can then write the above in matrix noting that the parameters 
we seek to estimate are contained in the diagonal matrix T and the matrix A. Let $  be the vector 
of indifferent types. We can then write the indifference equation as:
n  + p(M1 -  m 0)[j -  /?r(Mi -  M0) -  /?M0]_1( rn  -  ( / -  a)~xa  • o  -  $  =  o (a -7)
Which can be re-written as:
-  (I  -  A ) - 1 A  • l =  0 (A-8)
where V& =  /3-1 [/ — /?Mo](Mi — Mo)_1[II — $] and is an m s x 1 vector. Let P  =  diag([p(s')]s/es)> 
then we can re-write T =  (I — A )~ l (P  — A). These can be used in the above expression to yield
+  ( /  -  A )~X(P -  A )$  -  (I  -  A ) - 1 A  • t =  0 (A-9)
(.I  -  A ) ^  +  (P  -  A)<f> -  A  • i = 0 (A-10)
$  -  A® + P $  -  A $  -  A  i = 0 (A -ll)
+  P$] -  A[$ +  ^  4-1] =  0 (A-12)
Let us re-write the above by re-writing A as a vector A  =  [a(s')]s/es and re-writing the vector 
[<£ 4- r  +  l\ into a m s x m s diagonal matrix 0 . This will allow us to write the above equation as:
T + -  0A = ©_1[r + P$] -  A =  0 (A-13)
The first term is a vector containing only known elements. We now focus on the second term which 
is equal to A  =  [exp(o;o — a is ') ]5/es- We therefore take logs of our equation which yields
iog(0—1 [r +  p*]) =  iog(A) =  t o;oa i (A-14)
where £ is a m s x 2 matrix with a vector of ones in the first column and in the second column a 
vector of ones in the first m s/2  rows and zeros in the remaining rows. This is a matrix equation 
that is linear in the unknowns of the information cost distribution. This indicates that we have an 
overidentified system, since we have m s equations and only two unknowns per type of player.
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